DSO Debt and Private Equity in Dentistry

Posted: October 30, 2026
By Howard Farran, DDS, MBA

DSO Debt and Private Equity in Dentistry, Lessons From Affordable Care, Dental Care Alliance, Sonrava and Aspen

For years, the DSO growth story looked almost mechanical. Private equity raised money, borrowed more, bought dental practices at high multiples, combined them into larger platforms, and counted on growth and future refinancing to make the math work. That formula flourished when interest rates were low. It became much harder after 2022, when borrowing costs rose, wages climbed, reimbursement lagged, and some highly indebted dental groups discovered that busy operatories do not automatically generate enough cash to support billions of dollars of corporate debt.

The broader private equity market is approaching a major refinancing test. Roughly $300 billion of debt tied to private equity backed companies is scheduled to mature in 2028 and 2029. That does not mean $300 billion will default. Many borrowers will refinance, extend maturities, sell assets, receive new equity, or negotiate new terms before those dates arrive. But dentistry has already supplied several examples of what happens when the operating business can no longer carry the financing built above it.

Affordable Care is the clearest case. Harvest Partners acquired the company in 2021 for roughly $2.7 billion, using about $1.4 billion of private credit. By March 2026, Blackstone Private Credit Fund had marked its Affordable Care exposure at 69.8 cents on the dollar and placed the investment on nonaccrual, meaning repayment had become doubtful enough that the lender was no longer treating the loan as a normal performing credit. Affordable Care ultimately eliminated about $1 billion of debt, cut its debt load by roughly 65 percent, received $75 million of new capital, extended remaining maturities to 2031, and transferred ownership to its lenders. The dental offices remained open. Patients continued receiving care. The financing structure was what broke.

Dental Care Alliance reached a similar reset through a different path. In 2026, DCA eliminated more than $1.1 billion of funded debt, received $95 million of new capital, and pushed remaining maturities to 2031. Harvest Partners, which had backed DCA since 2015, now lists its investment as realized. Public information does not show exactly how much Harvest gained or lost, so claims that its equity was completely wiped out go beyond the evidence. What is clear is that lenders agreed to remove more than a billion dollars of debt because the previous balance sheet no longer worked.

Sonrava Health, formerly Western Dental, shows how the process can unfold over several years. Moody’s downgraded Sonrava as operating performance and liquidity weakened, and at one point expected debt to remain above 10 times EBITDA. Part of its debt traded at roughly 35 to 40 cents on the dollar. Sonrava used payment in kind interest, which allows interest to accumulate onto the loan balance instead of being paid fully in cash, and completed an earlier distressed exchange that bought time without fixing the underlying problem. In 2026, lenders converted debt into equity, injected about $100 million of new capital, and took control.

Aspen Group remains the unresolved case. The parent of Aspen Dental and ClearChoice has more than $3 billion of term loan debt scheduled to mature in December 2027. Its roughly $1.2 billion term loan fell from the high 90s to around 80 cents on the dollar before recovering somewhat. Moody’s and S&P have both carried negative outlooks, and an ad hoc lender group retained Gibson Dunn, a major restructuring law firm. Aspen has explored new investors, preferred equity, refinancing, and a possible sale of WellNow Urgent Care. None of that means Aspen has defaulted. It means its owners and lenders are taking the maturity seriously.

These cases have fueled a predictable debate. Critics say the DSO model is collapsing. Corporate announcements use softer language such as strategic transaction or strengthened financial foundation. Both descriptions can distort reality. Several large DSO capital structures clearly failed or required extraordinary intervention, but the broader industry continues to expand. Acquisitions continue, new offices are opening, and some large DSOs are performing well.

Heartland Dental is the strongest counterexample. S&P upgraded Heartland from B minus to B in 2026 after revenue increased 7.3 percent in 2025, supported by higher same office revenue, increased patient volume, better reimbursement, and improved provider utilization. S&P expects Heartland to fund much of its future growth from internally generated cash flow. That separates a healthy operating model from one that depends heavily on new borrowing to keep acquisitions moving.

For practicing dentists, the lesson begins with cash flow. A full schedule can hide a weak business. Production must become collections. Collections must cover payroll, supplies, laboratory costs, occupancy, technology, management overhead, and capital spending before anything is available for debt service. A practice can look busy from the hallway while the organization above it is short on cash.

When financial pressure reaches the practice level, dentists may notice leaner staffing, delayed equipment purchases, heavier production expectations, tighter scheduling, frequent leadership changes, or cuts in support services. None of those signs proves insolvency, and the available evidence does not show that every financially stressed DSO has compromised patient care. But they are worth watching because financial pressure rarely remains confined to a spreadsheet forever.

For practice owners considering a sale, rollover equity deserves even more scrutiny than the headline purchase multiple. A 10 times EBITDA offer can look better than a 7 times offer until you realize that part of the higher price consists of junior equity sitting beneath a heavily indebted parent company. Dentists should understand the buyer’s debt load, maturity schedule, cash interest burden, ownership structure, rights attached to rollover shares, and what has to happen before those shares can be sold. The second bite of the apple was never guaranteed.

Higher interest rates deserve part of the blame, but they did not create every weakness. Cheap money allowed companies to carry problems that became much harder to hide once financing costs rose. High purchase multiples, aggressive EBITDA adjustments, weak integration, poor doctor retention, excessive corporate overhead, thin margins, and optimistic assumptions about future refinancing all become more dangerous when money is expensive.

There is also a reason not to treat every restructuring as the death of the underlying business. When lenders erase debt and take ownership, they usually do so because they believe the operating company still has value. Affordable Care may now be financially healthier than before because it has roughly $1 billion less debt and fresh capital. DCA emerged with more than $1.1 billion less debt and another $95 million to invest. Those outcomes do not make the original capital structures successful. They show the difference between an equity failure and an operating business failure.

The next phase of DSO consolidation will probably look less glamorous than the last one. Buyers are becoming more selective. Multiples have come down. Sellers expecting 2021 prices are meeting more resistance. Growth will depend more on same office performance, doctor retention, collections, labor control, specialty integration, and whether technology actually improves productivity. The era when a DSO could create value mainly by buying the next practice and assuming cheaper refinancing would always be available is fading.

For dentists, the lesson is straightforward. Watch cash flow, not headlines. Understand the debt above your equity. Separate operating performance from financing structure. Treat corporate optimism and collapse narratives with equal skepticism. Dentistry still works. Consolidation still works. Debt still works. What no longer reliably works is paying aggressive prices for practices with borrowed money and assuming future growth will repair the economics later.

If your practice were suddenly forced to refinance at today’s cost of capital, would the business still work?

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DSO Debt and Private Equity in Dentistry

Private Equity Debt and Refinancing

The Wall Street Journal. A $300 Billion Debt Wall Is Looming Over Private Equity Backed Companies https://www.wsj.com/finance/investing/a-300-billion-debt-wall-is-looming-over-private-equity-backed-companies-d6359497

Affordable Care

Blackstone Private Credit Fund, SEC Filing, April 2026 https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1803498/000180349826000021/bcred-20260420.htm

Bloomberg. Blackstone, KKR Lead Debt Restructuring for Dental Services Firm https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-22/blackstone-kkr-move-to-restructure-1-4-billion-private-loan

Affordable Care Completes Strategic Transaction to Strengthen Financial Foundation and Support Future Growth https://www.affordablecare.com/news/2026/8/14/3rfr3yo277qsjj8fq15r6gn79sztko

Dental Care Alliance

Dental Care Alliance Closes Transaction to Strengthen Long Term Financial Foundation and Support Continued Growth https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20260602555971/en/

Harvest Partners. Dental Care Alliance

https://harvestpartners.com/portfolio/dental-care-alliance/

Sonrava Health and Western Dental

Octus. Healthcare Sector Quarterly, Sonrava Health and Premier Dental Services https://octus.com/resources/articles/healthcare-sector-quarterly-challenging-regulatory-backdrop-looming-for-healthcare-services-industry-with-aca-exchange-subsidies-set-to-expire/

9fin. Sonrava Health Equitizes Debt and Raises New Money https://www.9fin.com/insights/sonrava-health-equitizes-debt-and-raises-new-money

The Aspen Group and Aspen Dental

Octus. Aspen Group Pauses WellNow Sale, Targets Q3 for Comprehensive Refi https://octus.com/resources/articles/aspen-group-pauses-wellnow-sale-targets-q3-for-comprehensive-refi/


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